

AMERICA IMPERIALIST OR DEMOCRAT ?

BY

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India between the Two Wars Etc.*



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PREFACE.

Mr. Wendell willkie recently wrote a book called "One World." It has been very popular in America and noless than two million copies of it have been sold within a short time of its publication. Mr. Willkie has in that book criticised among other things the British and American Imperialisms and pleaded for an understanding of the viewpoint of India, China and Russia. How far has American Imperialism dominated the East? Are there any prospects of change of their policy towards this hemisphere? This book deals with these questions, and sets out to examine American attitude towards countries of the Far East, including India, from the time of death of Abraham Lincoln, when "Almighty Dollar" became supreme in U. S. A. down to year 1943, when the envoy of Roosevelt, Mr. Phillips arrived in this country.

February 1944,

HIRALAL SETH,

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CHAPTER I

SPREAD OF THE YANKEE IMPERIALISM

Democracy which seems an anti-theses of Imperialism, has always nourished that "enfant terrible" in its lap. It is quite another matter that sometimes democratic revolutions have foundered on the rock of Imperialism, as in case of France after 1792, or Germany after the Weimar republic but in other cases the middle class republics have allowed the ideals of Imperialism to flourish among its people—and after grabbing some territory or other at intervals of some years, it has assumed a respectable look, so typical of a middle class money-lender. Such was the case in England after that "glorious" revolution, which cost King Charles his head. Cromwell became the Lord Protector. That was the nearest approach to republicanism that the British had and the Liberals and radicals of that country are never tired of extolling that period. Yet Cromwell's revolution was the beginning of that Imperialism in England to which we were introduced after the battle of Plassey and which still dominates the major part of globe. Cromwell, the Liberator of British people was also the man who made Britannia rule the waves and who waged successful wars in the continent to maintain British hegemony in Europe

In America, the republican revolution, as soon as it had established a foothold in the States manifested the symptoms of Imperialism. The first act was the annexation of Texas and then the Mexican War in which the Yanks helped themselves to great part of Northern Mexico. The war of 1812 with Britain was an unsuccessful attempt to wipe out British Imperialism from Canada. For the next few decades American attention was directed to the forced opening up of the orient to American Financiers and Missionaries. The Chinese were the first to receive the doze of American declaration of Independence and the Rights of man from the mouths of the Long range naval guns of American fleet.

Next came the Japanese who were blitzed into submission by the terrific bombardment of Japanese coast by Admiral Perry in 1860. It took Japan Completely by surprise, and the Japanese were asmuch bewildered by it as the Americans were after the Pearl Harbour onslaught. The Yankee Admiral succeeded in having his own terms for the opening up of Japan to America. For the next few years the orientals were left to lick their own wounds. Hardly had the roar of guns died in the Japanese Waters when sparks of civil war were ignited in America. It was the culmination of the campaign, the Americans had been carrying on for exterminating the coloured people especially the Negroes and the Red Indians from the continent.

So great was the drive against these races and so fierce methods adopted that the American republicans were split in two factions like the French Girondists and Jacobins. These two parties of French revolution stood for two different ideals, while the Jacobins wanted to end all forms of exploitation, the Girondists wanted milk and water reforms which in fact perpetuated all the evils of the Empire of Lions XIV and his successors. In America there were two such factions—one of whose apostle was Abraham Lincoln who wanted to do away with slavery lock stock and barrel while the other wanted to maintain the *status quo*.

The result was the long civil war. It ended in victory of the Party of Abraham Lincoln but the followers of that great man could no more carry out his programme than the republicans like Louis Napoleon or theirs could follow in footsteps of Danton and Robespierre. A recent cartoon in an English weekly showed President Roosevelt sitting on a chair, while the ghost of Abraham Lincoln is standing near him, hand on his shoulders. The ghost says to Roosevelt "These dead shall not have died in vain : you have a greater task than I had. Slavery must be removed from the whole earth."

It would have been much better for the cartoonist to show President Wilson standing beside Roosevelt and telling him that "I was in same position as you are. I asked my country to enter war with a view to end exploitation and slavery in the world. I failed

in my mission. The world forgot its dead. America had not the courage to lift its voice. History may repeat itself." This would at least show that the Americans had forgotten to end slavery in the world and are likely to repeat the same matter again.

As a matter of fact they have forgotten all this humanistic talk about slavery these seventy years. Wilson, with whom we will deal in the next chapter was not the only man to forget it. The British cartoonist had in all innocence shown Abraham Lincoln encouraging Roosevelt on his world liberation mission as if the Americans had been doing nothing but liberating the world all this time!

The "forgetting of the dead" business began as soon as the civil war was ended. The Imperialism, of whose exponent were many Admirals, again became popular with Americans. The Imperialists after some abortive attempts to occupy Hawaii, Nicaragua and Santo Domingo in face of opposition at home succeeded in getting their policy accepted. Prof. Allan Nevins in his book "American in world affairs" thus describes the progress of Yankee Imperialism:—

"The partitioning of Africa by the European Powers had aroused in many Americans a desire for empire. Captain A. T. Mahan "the naval philosopher of the new Imperialism", preached not only the importance of Sea Power but the duty of carrying civilisation overseas. 'Comparative religion teaches that creeds which reject missionary enterprise are foredoomed to decay', he wrote. "May it not be so with nations. How much

poorer would the world have been had England heeded the cautious hesitancy that now bids us reject every advance beyond our shores." "These sentiments fell pleasingly upon the ears of rising politicians like Theodore Roosevelt and Henry Cabot Lodge. The growth of a sensational Press, with William Randolph Hearst, as its worst and Joseph Pulitzer as its best exemplar, strengthened the appetite for an exciting foreign Policy.

Many Protstants liked the idea of carrying religious light to heathen (or Catholic) areas. A feeling grew up among manufacturers and exporters that trade would follow the flag into new areas.

"Under the spell of Mahan and his own belief in a verile national Policy, Roosevelt as Assistant Secretary of the navy in 1898 fixed a day when the Secretary was absent, and ordered Far Eastern Squadron, which Dewey commanded at Hong Kong to be ready to descend upon Manila if war began with Spain. "The very devil seemed to possess him," John D. Lang, Secretary of the navy, wrote to Roosevelt. The battle of Manila Bay was sequel of that orders. The annexation of Phillipines was the sequel of the battle. Mckinly hesitated whether to take nothing, to take Luzon alone or to take the whole Archipelago. But reflection, prayer and a Western tour to sound out public sentiment compelled him to clean sweep. As E. L. Godrein put it. "God told duty to tell Destiny to tell Mckinley' to take all the Islands.

" At the same time Puerto Rico was annexed while Cuba was placed under a virtual protectorate, and ready for the building of the Isthmian Canal."

The inspiration from God which McKinley received has since then been received quite frequently by Hitler, who has before conquering a new country always declared that the God put the idea in his head.

However the Gods were more kind to McKinley than they are to Hitler, with his fleeing hordes on the Russian Front. The Yanks had not fought any major battle with a first rate European power since Washington cleared the British from the states. The 1812 War was a minor skirmish. The Spaniards were the first European power to cross swords with American Imperialists, and as they were the weakest, they were defeated. That war placed America in the front rank of military Powers. American interests in the orient were revived. The *Drang nach Osten* began now in right earnest. But situation was not the same as it was when that Walter Drake of American Navy—Perry first put out to sea. The Japs had not only in the years after the American civil war got rid of all the concessions that they had given to Americans and British under threat of force, but also built up immense military power. They had fought a sharp and swift war with China and grabbed some territory. It was to that weak and prostrate country, that America directed its attention. That was the time when every power wanted to benefit from China as much as they could, since that country

had been humbled by Japan. Sir Fredereck writes in his Book "China and Foreign Powers thus describe the role that America played in the Far East after the Sino-Japanese War.

"Not only did the 'open door' seem closed for ever, as the result of these operations (of Western Powers and Japan in China) but the doctrine of "spheres of influence" (or interest) looked like a mask for partition. President Mckinley then inquired of the Powers whether they adhered to the Principle of the 'open door'. Great Britian assented to the Principle without reserve ; the other powers with qualifications while Russia was evasive and hostile. The purpose of the United States was to protect American interest and with partial achievement of that purpose no further action was taken : but the powers had warning that a more or less interested party had taken note of their proceedings." American insistence on open door policy was a polite way of saying that it wanted to share in China spoils. The Western Powers wanted that while they stole the horse the Americans should not even look over the wall. This the yanks did. They not only looked over the wall. But shouted out that they had a right to share the spoils.

As the Chinese were themselves not taking complacently this breaking into their house, and the wicked fellows had risen to defend themselves in what had come to be known as the Boxer rebellion, the Americans

joined the British in bludgeoning China into submission. Boxer rebellion was ruthlessly suppressed and the Chinese forced to restore privileges of these powers. McKinley's work of *Drang nach Osten* was faithfully carried on by his successor Theodore Roosevelt, who had distinguished himself as a great "patriot" in Spanish-American war. Roosevelt resorted to the tactics of Power Politics, and while the British wooed the Japanese by an Anglo-Japanese alliance as a bulwork against Russia, the American President also encouraged Nippon to move northwards into Siberia. The war between Russia and Japan would have never come about if England and America had not patted Japan on the back. It is strange that the first trial of strength, which Japan had with any Western Powers, and which inspired it for all its subsequent wars against the white races, including the present one, should have been encouraged by the very powers whose sworn enemy it became. If Japan had not defeated Russia in 1904, it could not have the courage to attack the interests of other powers in the East and to establish its hegemony over that area.

In another way this move of the astute politicians in Whitehall and Washington, was likely to recoil on them and endanger their Imperial and colonial interests. The war of 1904 which gave rise to Japanese militarism was also the war which crippled Russia, and which brought about the abortive revolution of 1905. The rise of Nippon also coincided with rise of another force in Russia, which was to give awakening to not only

the people of Asia, but of all the world which was to strike at the roots of not only Imperialism in China, but of Imperialism everywhere. It was the force of communism. The Czar crushed the revolution of 1905, just as the Japanese Emperor sought to curb all those elements in Japan which elated with Victory against Russia, wanted to wipe out all White Powers off the face of globe. But both these forces had come to stay in Russia, as well as Japan. They represented the new spirit, though the one was based on the idea of uplifting the poor, and the other on racial hatred. The one brought peace and bread for all. The other was aimed at furthering the interests of Japanese nation in the world.

Theodore Roosevelt, when he visited Japan in 1907 and hobnobbed with its Emperor, was hardly conscious of the rise of these two new forces in Russia and Japan. He came back pleased, because the interests of American capitalists were safe in China, because the bonds of friendships had been cemented between the people of the land of Rising Sun and America.

The two Imperialists had met and had carved out their respective spheres of influence. The Japs were to gradually expand in China, keeping the interests of American investors safe while the Americans were to spread south in Latin America and Mexico, and translate the Monroe doctrine into action. "Each for himself, and the interests of our capitalists over us all." That was the American policy in 1907.

The remarkable thing about all those goody-goody talks at Tokyo between Roosevelt and the Emperor, was that Manuel Quezon, the Filipino barrister, when he visited U.S.A. a little later was received with open arms by the Press and the Public had allowed to conduct a campaign for the Liberation of his country from Yankee Imperialism. Theodore Roosevelt was the first to encourage the sentiments of the Filipinos for Independence. His policy aimed at gradual withdrawal of American domination over Philippines. This may be thought by some as an example of the freedom-loving nature of the Americans and a proof that American policy was anything but Imperialist at that time.

Actually that was not so. The freedom allowed to Quezon in America to carry on campaign for his country was only a sop to the racial sentiments of the Filipinos excited by the Russo-Japanese War. While Quezon spoke in U.S.A. the plans for building up naval and military bases in Manila were being chalked out.

Said the Americans, "we are willing to allow gradual freedom to your country Don Quezon, but we must strengthen American strength there to prevent your country becoming a morsel to the Japanese." Was it really so? Did the Americans want to save Philippines as early as 1910. If that had been the case it should have never been lost to-day.

The American policy of appeasing Japan was in direct conflict with the safety and Independence of Philippines.

We have said that Russo-Japanese war was the signal for rise of Jap militarism which posed before the Asiatic people as their liberator. And Phillipines was directly threatened by Japan after 1905. The Americans who talked about freeing Phillipines were paving the way for the day, when Japan should grab it. All this seems paradoxical. And yet that was the truth. The oppressed nations like the Phillipines were merely pawns in the game. Because it suited the American financiers to placate Japan, Filipinos could be allowed to face hell when the Japs came.

Supposing Theodore Roosevelt had not the interests of American financiers at heart. What would have happened, should have proved beneficial to the oppressed nations of the East, Indians, Chinese, Filipinos, and the people of Dutch Indies.

If freedom rather than Imperial interests had been dear to the Americans, the policy of that nation in international affairs after the civil war should have been that of aiding the oppressed nations of the East, the people of Europe, groaning under the weight of despotic rule of Emperors of Austria, Hungary, Germany and Russia and finally the people of Latin America and Mexico, being ruled by adventures and militarists, who kept the population uneducated and the country without any industrialisation, using the exchequer to further their own interests. It would be in that case very much like the policy of the Soviet Government after 1919 revolution or that of French revolutionaries

for a brief time after 1792. America in that case should have been a bulwark against the rise of Imperialisms of England, Germany, Japan and Russia. Her peculiar geographical position would have kept her immune from any invasion by a coalition of powers assuming that such a combination was possible in face of the rivalries between various nations and the opposition of the people of Europe.

America had no need to send her navy or armed forces to such far flung countries of the world to aid the oppressed. Such a policy of permanent revolution could not be practicable at all. What was possible and what the Americans did not do was to stop playing the game of power politics and Imperialism and give its moral and material backing to the people of the East.

If it had not to defend its colonial interests in China it could very well do without Phillipines and the Pacific Islands that it later on grabbed. In that case Theodore Roosevelt would have found no need to keep Nippon in good humour.

The time was propitious for such a policy after the Russo-Japanese war. There was great ferment in those days against white domination in India, South Africa, Phillipines, China and the East Indies. The Japanese were cleverly exploiting their victory against Russia to assume the leadership of the Nations of the East. The coloured felt great sympathy towards Japan. The Revolution in China was actually engineered and

plotted in Japan. Sun Yat-sen was receiving help from that country. Whatever the evil motives of Japan it was no doubt at that time proving a great incentive to the oppressed. Did Theodore Roosevelt give any help to the Chinese revolutionaries or even sympathetic words to the people groaning under Dutch and British Imperialism in the East Indies and India. No, he left that to Japan.

The Japanese kept the facade of good relations with U.S.A. and England, and beneath the surface plotted against their hold in the East. The anti British and anti American element though still not prominent was nevertheless being tolerated ' by the Nippon and allowed to do the mischief. It spread racial hatred and people began to feel prejudiced against white race as a whole. It mattered very little whether it was Democratic, republican or monarchist in its own country.

The white race began to be associated with Imperialism, till the two words became hardly distinguishable from each other. To-day after lapse of decades that ghastly mistake is still being made. Even Russia in spite of its profession of freedom for all is being viewed with suspicion by coloured people. Americans were responsible for fostering this mentality in the East. Of all the white powers they were most fitted to end it. Their credit was still high in the East. Apart from Admiral Perry's bombardment of Japan some coercion in China and grabbing of Phillipines they had done nothing comparable to the

gigantic Empire building of the Germans the French, the British, the Dutch and the Russians.

Some people in Japan remembered Perry's raid ; in China, the Nationalists may have some grudge against Americans but not much. Few cared why it had fought Spain and its rule in Philipines was better than that of British in India, the Dutch in East Indies and the French in Indo-China. It was far off from countries of the East and the people in this hemisphere had only the haziest idea of what America was. A halo was attached to its fight against the British and progressive people had a sentimental attachment for its republicanism. Above all it had the fascination of all new things, for the imaginative oriental mind. It was easier for Americans to stand out of the crowd of other Western racketeers and Imperialists fleecing East. Instead they used all their science and learning, craftsmanship and cunning to out bid the other Imperialists in the mad race for exploitation of the orient.

CHAPTER II

"SENTIMENTALISM, HARDHEADEDNESS AND BLUFF."

An American writer discussing the Pacific question in a recent book described the American policy in the East to be a mixture of "Sentimentalism, hard-headedness and bluff." It may be added that this is true of American policy not only of recent years which the writer was discussing but ever since America began its *Drang nach Osten*. In the last Chapter we discussed the antics of Washington State Department in regard to their contradictory policy in the Phillipines and Japan. We have seen that no less a high personage than Theodore Roosevelt indulged in all the familiar tactics of power politics. When that great American was replaced by Woodrow Wilson in the White House, the American strategy remained same, though tactics altered. Woodrow Wilson along with Kellogg represents the "Sentimentalists" in American policy towards the East since 1914. Coolidge Harding and Franklin Roosevelt may be identified with the policy of "hardheadedness." And finally Secretary of State Stimson, and Admiral Knox, with all their blusterings against Japan are the exponents of "bluff tactics."

These seven men between themselves shared the honours of keeping the prestige of Uncle Sam intact

in the countries of the orient between the years 1914—1943. Whatever attitude America adopted towards this hemisphere was the result of efforts of these people. We will deal with them each in turn. Let us take first Wilson, the sentimentalist. He continued Roosevelt's policy of appeasement of Japan. The Japanese when they saw European nations in throes of a grim conflict presented their 21 demands to China in 1915. They were very much similar to those which Nazis presented to Dolfuss and Schushnigg before over running their country, China was to recognise special rights of Japan in the North and raise no objection to Japanese stationing of troops on its borders. It was to curb anti-Japanese elements, and reorganise its industries with Jap help. The demands also emphasised the superiority of Japanese claims to that of Western powers.

This was the first attempt of the Japs to push out the white powers from China. Wilson sat tight. The British had their hands full in Europe. Americans were reluctant to fight with Japan, when their interests were "apparently" safe.

Then came the Pacific drive of Japan. Japan occupied all the Pacific Islands of Germans before the British could interfere and presented them with a *fait accompli*.

The occupation of these Islands constituted a direct threat to Phillipines. For the first time Don Quezon's land was sand-witched between Japan proper and

Nippon's Island Empire. American's love for freedom and safety of Phillipines did not compel her to challenge Japan.

American Industrial magnates and militarists were thinking of a drive in their own hemisphere. They wanted to stabilise their position in South America. This was their own sphere. The "Monroe doctrine" reference to which has been made earlier, aimed at preventing any territory in this hemisphere falling in hands of other powers.

Was not there a danger of the war spreading to this side of globe? What if either of the belligerents attacked South America to liquidate the interests of the other. Such were the thoughts of militarists in Washington. They wanted the Monroe Doctrine up-to-date and that is how they brought it. Before the Jap drive in the Pacific they had intervened in Mexico. Revolution had broken out there. It was a revolution carried out by the Nationalists to reorganise their country and eradicate poverty and illiteracy and stop the intrigues of foreign powers, including that of the United States. They intervened. Vera Cruz was occupied by American forces. The Mexican Provisional President General Victoriano Huerta was forced out of office by Americans, and civil strife came in the wake of revolution, which was encouraged by Washington.

Then in 1915 came the American occupation of Haiti and Dominican Republic.

This is how it is described by an American journalist of world renown, John Gunther in an article in

"Foreign affairs" captioned "Hispaniola."

"During the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries both Haiti and Dominican Republic now Independent States were tormented by the most vicious kind of Civil Disorder and revolution. By 1915 Haiti in particular had succumbed to complete political chaos. There had been six presidents in four years, and three of them were murdered. One President named Guillaume Sam was torn to pieces by a mob that dragged him from the French legation after he had slaughtered a batch of political opponents. The United States intervened, and our marines took over protection of Public order, we had been contemplating intervention for a considerable time."

The civil disorders in Haiti are hardly different from Civil Disorders in Czechoslovakia and Poland before German invasion or in China in 1915, in Manchuria 1931 and in Shanghai 1937-38, before Jap onslaught. That America had imperialist designs on that country is clear from the last sentence. Mr. John Gunther does not hide American intentions. He is a very good man, and his love of freedom of the oppressed people unquestionable. Instead of muzzling the truth, he tries to explain away American invasion in the following words, "This was one of the earliest and is probably the most celebrated case of what came to be known later as "Yankee Imperialism." Beyond doubt Americans entered Haiti for mixed motives some of them dubious. We wanted to save lives and protect foreign property. But also we wanted to protect private

American investors who had an important stake in the country—and what counted more—important friends in Washington. Bloodshed in Haiti was to some extent a pretext for intervention, not the real reason. American interests were largely concentrated in the National Bank of Haiti and a railroad concession controlled by the National City Bank of New York. The whole is an unsavory story, the best summary is that of Ernest Gruening in foreign affairs for January 1933. Once established in Haiti, the American Administration took control of the Government, wrote a new constitution ruled through puppet politicians and forced the country to float a large loan on exorbitant terms."

Having realised that he has been very much critical of American methods, John Gunther tones down and says :—

But (it is important to state) the American occupation was probably a very good thing for Haiti on the whole. We never intended permanent settlement or conquest, we had no idea of making Haiti a colony in the orthodox Imperial way. The American occupation lasted for 19 years until 1934 when the good neighbour policy was getting fairly under way—and it ended a year ahead of schedule. Too long certainly. But American guidance and control grew wiser and more lenient as the years went by. We ended a period of appalling violence and we restored political stability and public order. We contributed to education and public works. The cost to Haitian civil liberties was negligible. After all there had been no civil liberties

before.

This is all very crude. The Japanese have been saying the same about China, which according to them has been enslaved by Anglo-Saxon Imperialists in alliance with Chiang-Kai-Shek. America had Imperialist designs on Haiti. Mr. Gunther admits it. Then why try to explain it away? Why not call a spade a spade, when you have struck it on the ground and flung a heap of earth in the air. You could not do it by softly moving your fingers over the earth.

After dealing with Haiti, John Gunther describes the American occupation of Dominican Republic.

"American intervention also took place in the Dominican Republic. Our marines went there in 1916, a year after our entrance into Haiti, but they stayed only till 1924. Intervention in the Dominican Republic never aroused as bitter resentment either locally or among liberals in the United States as did our prolonged Haitian adventures. Anyway the chapter is closed or closing. Our armed forces are maintained in either country by the United States to-day. Nor do we maintain any direct political control. In the Dominican Republic we have gradually unloosed financial strings, though we maintain a lien on Dominican revenues until the debt is liquidated. In Haiti we still maintain a fiscal representative who superintends local finances and controls the customs in collaboration with Haitian authorities."

In this passage the conflict in mind of Gunther

becomes quite obvious. The voice which had been somewhat diffidently and with a guilty conscience speaking on behalf of American vested interests flags towards the end. "Anyway the chapter is closed or closing"...In this way Gunther throws away the cudgels he had taken to defend militarists.

That seems to be sensible enough. What is astonishing is not that Gunther has tried to explain away Yankee Imperialism and then given up the attempt; obviously no genuine freedom-loving man could succeed in that. The remarkable thing about all these "closing" or "about to close chapters" is the attitude of Woodrow Wilson, the arch-exponent of freedom and Liberalism, when "the chapter was still open."

Observe him speaking before the Congress in March 1917:—

"We desire neither conquest nor advantage; we wish nothing that can be had only at the cost of another people. We have always professed an unselfish purpose and we covet the opportunity to prove that our professions are sincere, there are many things still to do at home to clarify our own politics, and to add a new vitality to the industrial processes of our own life; and we shall do them as time and opportunity serve; but we realise that greatest things that remain to be done must be done with the whole world for a stage and in co-operation with the wide universal forces of mankind; and we are making our spirits ready for these things. They will follow in the immediate wake of the war itself, and set up our civilisation again.

We are provincials no longer. The tragical events of thirty months of vital turmoil through which we have just passed have made us citizens of the world. There can be no turning back. Our own fortunes as a nation are involved, whether we would have it or not and yet we are not the less Americans if we but remain true to the principles in which we have been bred.

They are not the principles of a province or of a single continent. We have known and boasted all along that they were the principles of liberated mankind.

These, therefore, are the things we shall stand for whether in War or Peace; that all nations are equally interested in the Peace of the world and in the political stability of free peoples, and are equally responsible for their maintenances, that the essential principle of Peace is the actual equality of all nations in all matters of right or privilege, that Peace cannot securely or justly rest upon an armed balance of power; that Governments derive all their just powers from the consent of the governed and that no other powers should be supported by the common thought, purpose or powers of the family of nations that the seas should be equally free and safe for the use of all peoples under rules set up by common agreement and consent, and that so far as is practicable they should be accessible to all on equal terms; that national armaments should be limited to the necessities of national order and domestic safety; that the Community of interests and power

upon which Peace will henceforth depend imposes upon each nation the duty of seeing to it that all influences proceeding from its own citizens meant to encourage or assist revolution in other states should be sternly and effectually suppressed and prevented."

The denial of "intentions of conquest or advantage" had been made by a man who as commander-in-chief of American forces was responsible for overrunning of Haiti, Dominican Republic and Mexico a few years earlier. As that Liberal Statesman was talking shod about freedom and peace on the floor of the American Congress, people in newly-acquired American dominions were groaning under the weight of Imperialism. And farther still in South America shrewd Yankee financiers and diplomats were tightening the noose round the neck of people of those countries and paving the way for American *wehrmacht* exactly as the German trade delegates to Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary were doing before those countries were finally absorbed in the third Reich. With Americans as with Germans advancing of trade and diplomatic relations has been a prelude for armed intervention in one form or another. The "Good neighbour" policy of which Mr. Gunther talks somewhat glibly had been undertaken towards the South American States long ago and under cover of financial help and industrial reorganisation the South American republic were tied to the apron strings of American finance-capitalism.

American trade relations with these countries

increased as the European nations dug their grave deep in the battlefields of Flanders, and found it increasingly difficult to supply the needs of these countries or receive their exports.

Fattening on the South American boom the Yankee Industrialists had found it possible to lend to Britain money and material and thus make America a party to that Imperialist war long before the sinking of *Lusitania* and the German campaign of unrestricted submarine warfare. In the East as we have observed the American President's sentimental phrases about freedom did not prevent Japan from browbeating China or under secret treaty with Britain, which promised military help to that hard-pressed country ; taking over the control of German Pacific Islands. This step of Nippon which was the first stage for enslavement of the Chinese and Filipinos, was taken under the very nose of President Wilson.

As for the peace and equality of all nations about which Wilson talked so confidently, we all know what sort of a peace emerged out of that conference of allied freebooters in the Hall of Mirrors at Versailles. That peace was aimed at dismemberment of Germany and hegemony of Britain and France over Europe. The Europe that emerged out of war of 1914—18, was hardly different from the Europe as it is today, with Berlin as capital, with the only difference that the small states were not formerly incorporated in the dominions of England and France. The financial, political or even internal affairs, so far as opposition to such dangerous

ideas as socialism and communism was concerned, were controlled by Anglo-French bloc, till the crises of 1929 upset the European apple cart.

As for America, it allowed a *Carte Blanche* to England and France. Never had a nation such tremendous stakes in world affairs, and never had it so piously abdicated in favour of people, who it knew left to themselves, would make a strange mess of affairs.

The result of all this was that neither Peace came nor equality. The war had ended, but a state of war continued, just as it continues today in occupied parts of Europe.

The hardening of attitude of the Western powers at Versailles was also a signal for hardening of American attitude. Instead of "Sentimentalism," there was "Hardheadedness." The Americans had been sentimental, because it did not cost much to be that. America had no territorial ambitions in Europe, hence the lack of appreciation of the stand of England and France at the Versailles. But since it was not America that was to be dominated by these powers its sentimental attachment towards defeated or oppressed nations began to flag. It had taken the middle way, because that was the safest and made it popular with all, the Imperialists as well as the oppressed. It wanted to have best of both worlds, so long as its own was not disturbed.

And after Versailles it became clear that nobody cared two hoots for the ideas of Wilson. The oppressed derided them, and the Imperialists were

ruling with the gloves off.

Versailles was followed by massacre at Amritsar the French occupation of Ruhr and 'increased' intervention against the "Reds".

The world was back at the Pre-war stage of intrigues and moves and countermoves of Power Politics.

Sentimental Wilson was replaced by Hardheaded Harding. Then came the Washington Conference for limitation of Naval Power. Uncle Sam had vital interests at stake in the East. If the Japs built up a more powerful Navy than him, those interests would be endangered. Peace and League of Nations were good enough for Europe. But America preferred the old-fashioned way of agreements between groups of powers with whom its interests were closely allied. If such conferences looked old fashioned and Imperialist did that matter? The Washington Naval Conference met. Nine Powers attended it. A Ratio of 5 : 5 : 3 was fixed for Great Britain, America and Japan. The exclusion of Russia meant that not only political recognition was denied to her but even her navy was not thought worth the account. And this inspite of the fact that Russia's role in any matter relating to Pacific was always likely to have important bearing on the situation.

The essentially Imperialists Character of Washington Conference was clear from this attitude towards Russia. Germany was also not invited and the Conference in fact confirmed the attitude of England and France towards that unfortunate country, which was denied

the "right of the Seas" as Wilson called it in his speech, lacking any Navy it could not exercise any freedom of the Seas.

Why were the Americans so discriminating towards Russia, against whom they encouraged a *Cordon Sanitaire*, and why were they leaning towards Japan. Because Soviet Policy in the far East was anti-Imperialist and aimed at ending of all exploitation of China including that which was carried on by the Czarist regimes. The Chinese Nationalist Government of Dr. Sun-yat-sen was being helped by Russia to exterminate not only Chinese War Lords but also the Foreign vested interests. Imperialist America had joined hands with aggressive Nippon, because it faced doom in China. The politicians in Washington had foreseen the trend of events in the Far East from 1921 onwards.

They knew that an antagonised Japan would exploit the situation in China and so adopted a friendly attitude. The nightmare of American military strategists, as we will find in the years after the war, was not Japan alone, but a combination of Japan and Russia or even a rapprochement between them. America has seen safety for its interests in the East only in a conflict between Russia and Japan. Such a conflict was likely after 1921.

"Japanese as a great power in Asia would resent permeation of Soviet influence in China" argued the American strategists; and they would be in that case on the same side of barricades as us."

In the early days of anti-Foreign riots in China

during the years 1923-25, the Japanese continued to straddle on the fence. The interests attacked were those of the white nations ; and Japanese who by that time had begun to consider both England and America as its rivals in sea power, could afford to watch the disturbances in China with detached amusement. They could play a duel role, on the one side extending sympathy to China as a coloured race in grip of white Imperialism and on the other gloating over misfortunes of England and America, glad that there was no possibility of rapprochement between Russia, its ancient enemy and united States. Just as the Americans have wanted a conflict between Nippon and Russia to maintain balance of power in the Far East, so have the Japs sought to poison the relations of Russia and America.

But Soviet intervention in China during those years was much more than a moral and material help to the harassed Chinese ; through the Chinese Communist Party, its mouthpiece, both the Narko-mandel (Soviet Foreign office) and the Comintern wanted to communise China. That proved to be the red rag for the Japanese bull. As the struggle against white powers culminated in struggle for power between the Kuomintang and the communists, the Jap agents backed Chiang-Kai-shek against Borodin. It was in Japan's interest that China should be weakened by internal warfare and if it had to choose between a China governed by the Reds and a China in control of reactionary faction of Kuomintang, it would certainly

prefer the latter.

The split in the Kuomintang had driven the left faction consisting of the followers of Dr. Sun Yat-sen into arms of the communists. Sun Yat-sen had taken help from both Russia and Japan in turn and had eventually decided to incorporate the ideas of the Soviet state into his famous three principles ; Socialism Nationalism and Democracy. He had great respect for Japan but towards his last year, he had begun more and more to lean towards Russia. He realised that the growth of Imperialism in Japan was an ill omen for the young Chinese Republic.

All this was not true of Chiang Kai-shek and several of his fallowers in Kuomintang. They had visited only Japan and had been from the beginning influenced by its ideas rather than those of Russia. So it was easy for Chiang to battle with the Reds rather than unite with them in an anti-foreign (including anti-Japanese) drive. The Reds he thought had been going too far against the foreigners. He made peace with latter and launched a struggle against the former. Thus in the years 1926--1930 the interests of Japan and America coincided in the East. Both were horrified at the Red menace to their Imperialist and colonial interests, and when the Chinese began to fight among themselves, there was a sigh of relief in Tokyo as well as Washington. Chiang Kai-shek was in the good books of foreigners.

Having thus stabilized the hold of its finance-capitalism in the Orient, the American State Department flew

a kite. While the Chinese Generalissimo Chiang Kai-shek waded in the blood of peasants and workers and after staging the ghastly massacre in Shanghai marched northwards, the American let their sentimentalists flirt with peace policy. Pacific jargon and sentimental shibboleths of Woodrow Wilson which had been given a go by since the death of that self-deluded idealist were now revived by the Secretary of State Kellog. A pact known as "Kellog-Briand Pact" was initiated to which the major nations of the world were asked to give their signature renouncing war as an instrument of aggression. The Americans had made this move with an eye on the Far East, where they feared that Japan may not strike at their vital interests. They wanted to use the atmosphere of goodwill in Tokyo to their own advantage. Besides the Japanese, the French, and the British had also vital interests in the Far East and through the medium of this Pact each of these nations sought to assure the other that it would not go to war to settle its disputes with them.

The League of Nations was there to prevent nations from going to war and its article XVI was a sufficient guarantee of peace if it was what the nations wanted. But the Americans had ignored that body from the very beginning. In their occupation with power politics tactics in 1921 they had forgotten the League and initiated the move of naval limitation from the White House, rather than let Geneva steal a march over it. Having once made an agreement over the head of the League, they did so again in 1928 when Kellog-Briand

Pact was signed. Besides the Americans did not want to lag behind the British in the game of power politics. The British had a couple of years before signed the Locarno Treaty between themselves, the French and the Germans which they thought was the greatest achievement of "peace in our time" policy.

If the John Bull could grin merrily brandishing the Locarno treaty why should Uncle Sam sit quietly. Any piece of paper to which the powers had appended their signature was considered valuable in that hystoric decade after the war when men went crazy about peace and security. Imperialist powers who had grabbed territories and colonial markets as the prize of the war, felt distinctly insecure in its new wealth and trade boom and in a feverish state of self-analysis they clung to peace treaties and conferences as a drowning man clutches at a straw. What our Predecessors lacked, they thought, was a fund of international goodwill and ability to call conferences renouncing war and aggression. So they had plentiful of treaties and conferences. But serene optimism of the capitalists was disturbed by the onrushing tide of economic crises in 1929. Different states hit upon several methods of getting rid of the crises. The Japanese method was, an attack on Manchuria. The Americans had also been hit by the crises, but, Secretary of State Stimson had enough breath left to bluster at Japan in 1931 for scrapping the Kellog Pact. There was no use wasting any sentimentalism on Japan. The time for that sort of policy was not the early years

of the new decade when revolutionary changes were taking place over the surface of the Earth. Strong words were required to deal with abnormal times. Others were rearming and like Japan expanding. Pacific language had come to mean as a sign of weakness. Even the German Chancellor was threatening to scrap the treaty of Versailles.

The Americans were strong enough to defend their interests in the Far East or elsewhere, said Stimson, let any body dare to belittle the Yanks! As for the Japanese the Secretary of State would certainly have broken their skull in two if only the British would join them. The British would not hear of such a thing and sent their ablest lawyer John Simon to Geneva to argue the case on behalf of their old friend Japan. How did the Americans take this rebuff from Britain? The Americans did not seize this opportunity. They swallowed the insults by the British and waited for opportunity to repay them in the same coin.

After blustering at Japan the Americans attitude suddenly became sober towards the events in Far East. The reason was the election to Presidentship of New York State Governor Franklin Delano Roosevelt. He tried to reorganise American industry by his New Deal Programme. He realised that to regain economic prosperity, America needed a stabilised policy at home and abroad. An American writer William Dwight Whitney in a recent book "Who are the Americans" tells us that America had suffered

as much as a result of the 1729 crises as Germany. That the average income of an American citizen was reduced to between fifty and sixty per cent. of what it had been before and 10,000,000 people had been thrown out of work.

Such was the stupendous task Roosevelt faced on coming to office. Could he continue the bluff policy of Stimson under these circumstances? Obviously he could not. So when the Japanese grabbed Jehol and some North China Provinces in 1933 the State Department sat on the fence.

The American argument was simple. If the Industry was to be reorganised could the Americans do without £20,000,000 of raw silk from Japan so valuable to a country where even the poorest girl would not wear cotton dress but have silken wardrobe? Again could the Americans dispense with Malaya Rubber, and let its Motor Industry one of the five great Industries in the land be wiped out, if the Japs cut off the supplies from the East? Finally could the American oil kings undergo the loss of heavy shipments of oil to Japan? That was the problem which Roosevelt faced. His New Deal programme had already enraged the American Industrialists because it sought to benefit the labour at the expense of the capital. One step more either in home or Foreign affairs and the Wall Street would have risen in revolt and smashed the Roosevelt regime. Roosevelt had not the courage to face the American Industrialists, nor the conviction that interests

of labour in America and of Chinese coolies being oppressed by the Japanese Imperialism were of greater importance than the pleasure of Wall Street capitalists. Like all Liberals in power, he ended by playing into hands of reaction.

Prosperity came to America, and with prosperity a desire to sit tight so long as American financial interests were not assailed by any power. Thus when Japan attacked China in 1937, American Industrialist continued to supply China with munitions and even money and Japan with oil to bomb the Chinese cities. America's responsibility for the scenes of rape massacre, destruction, and pillage in Nanking, Shanghai and Canton is as great as was the responsibility of the British and American Governments for the destruction of Barcelona, Madrid and Valencia during the Spanish civil war.

Although Japan was branded as an aggressor by American spokesman, yet she continued to get material needed for prosecution of war in China. Apart from the storm of protests on sinking of U.S.A. gunboat. "Panay" there was no stern warning to Tokyo to desist from its Imperial aims. And when the Japanese had apologised about "Panay" incident the matter was considered closed.

In fairness to the Japanese, it may be remarked that they had fathomed the intentions of America in regard to East and apart from the "Panay" incident never gave her any opportunity to complain. They knew that both America and

England were their enemies, both were aiding China, yet paradoxical as it may seem the Japanese had after the Stimson. "Hands off Manchuria" speech leaned more towards America, than Britain. The reason was not that Britain was Imperialist and America was not. It was because the Japs could not do without American aid. Faced with two opponents, Britain and America, they chose the lesser evil. The Japanese textile Industry had been already ruined as a result of strained relations with Britain. If America became estranged, it would spell a doom for Jap heavy Industry and the Japanese war machine would become bogged in China. Besides Britain was too much occupied in European affairs to turn to Japan. Hence the stiffening of Jap attitude towards Britain.

The climax of this came in the summer of 1939 when Japanese fulfilled outside Tientsin the dreams of Kaiser and Napoleon to successfully blockade and drive out the British. While the British citizens were striped and insulted, the Americans were left unmolested.

The American State Department, remembering the rebuff administered to Stimson did not come to the aid of the British. It was right in saying that British policy was based on appeasement both in Europe and the Far East. The Americans had been enraged by British betrayal of Czechoslovakia at Munich. But it was a case of pot calling the kettle black. One cannot take seriously the indignation of Americans over Munich deal

or accept such pious statements as the following made by William Dwight Whitney in the beginning of his book "Who are the Americans"? "when an Englishman (and I shall use that term sometimes with due apologies, to Scotsmen, Ulstermen, Irishmen and Welshmen, to include them too), when an Englishman thinks as a citizen, he has two facets of thought, he thinks either as an islander or as a member of a great world-wide Empire. He is either insular or imperial. Indeed he is both. The American is neither.

The American is continental-like the Russian, yes like the German. This does not mean that he is a communist or a Nazi—obviously not (though it may appear that he is a little closer to both than is the average Englishman.) But he is certainly not an islander and he is certainly not an imperialist"

Note the feeling of guilt in the word "certainly not". This characterises the statement of all freedom loving Americans from Gunther to Dwight Whitney, from Edgar Ansel Mowrer to Edgar Snow and Louis Fischer. The impartial American (a very rare specie) knows the faults of his countrymen and gives them away somewhat diffidently in his utterances. Such matters are not easily explained (as it seems to some Americans) by holding up the British to ridicule for their Imperialism. If the British perpetrated one Munich and backed two horses in the East aiding the Chinese and patting the Japs on the back at the same time, have not the Americans done the same in the East?

As for the British thinking of themselves in terms of either an Island people or as Imperialists have not the majority of Americans the same feeling ? They think either in terms of their own hemisphere, where they want to apply Monroe doctrine or of their interests in the Far East. The occasions when they have disinterestedly taken part in European affairs have been few and such attempts have fondered on rocks due to lack of sincerity to continue that interest.

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The truth is that there were certain differences between British and American outlook in the eighteenth and early nineteenth century. Freedom as Washington Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln understood it was different from the similar term used in England, by Pitt, Casterleagh, Canning, Disreali and other British statesmen. America, fresh from a revolution against its aggressors and still in feudal social relations could then think in terms of French revolution ideas of Liberty and equality. Industrialisation had not come. The question of labour and capital had not disturbed its surface. It had no differential stratum of high and low in its society as the British had. There were only land owners, their slaves, farmers working on other's land and petty shopkeepers or business men. All of these had united in struggle against the British. The military life which had bound these various classes together had after the revolution left them with a feeling of brotherhood and equality.

To it was added the elation at liberation from foreign yoke and out of this tension in American Society emerged the Declaration of Independence and Rights of Man.

But while the Americans were uniting the recalcitrant states or carrying on a war against Indians revolutionary changes were sweeping over the countries across the Atlantic.

The spirit of French revolution, which had been crushed in Europe after the Napoleonic absolutism was revived in France in 1848, in a revolution, which was different from any that had previously taken place in world. It was the revolution carried out, by the new revolutionary force, the working class. It miscarried because Louis Bonaparte used it to further his own interests, but nevertheless it left its mark on Europe's history. The spirit shown by the Paris working class, was a warning about the future.

In Germany and in England it inspired the workers to action. In America and Russia it led to the movement for freeing of the slaves and the serfs. In the former country it was ably led, but it miscarried through no fault of Abraham Lincoln.

The death of Abraham Lincoln brought America to the same stage as France under Louis Napoleon after the betrayal of revolution of 1848 or England following the unrest after the Napoleonic wars. In both countries Imperialists and vested interests began to dominate. Same was true of America. After about a

century of the American War of Independence, the principles for which Washington, Jefferson and Lincoln lived and died gave way to new ideas of Industrialisation, exploitation, hunt for markets, in short the age of capitalism had come in America, which because of the country's vast resources soon took the shape of aggressive expansion.

After Lincoln, the line of demarcation between British and American interests, thinned down. Both have been treading the same road. But even so in the past the Americans have spread themselves somewhat hesitatingly, occupying little territory and defending their interests by "Sentimentalism, hard-headedness and bluff", rather than force of arms.

Since Roosevelt's days, however new weapons have been added to the old armoury. American war machine has been expanded to back up the "bluff." "Hardheadedness" does not mean defending of small colonial interests here and there. It means making the entire world dependent on American finance capitalism. The capitalists having survived the crises of 1929 have become cynical towards others interests.

And they have borrowed a thing or two from the British Imperialism.

One of them is aiding a Nation to arm and fight elsewhere, while you make financial profit out of the two belligerents, and prepare your war machine to deal with it when the time came.

The British armed Germany and encouraged its

designs on ' small Nations while they allowed Japs to increase their military strength. The Americans armed Japs and encouraged them to fight China while they prepared for final combat with them. When this combat or indeed any other combat should take place was for the financiers to decide.

The British financiers had made a decision in September 1939 to fight Germany not to preserve integrity of Poland but for the credit advanced to that country. The guarantees to Roumania and Poland were actuated less by fear of German expansion than by the interest of British financiers who wanted the German capitalists to be deprived of exploitation of Roumanian oil fields. In case of Poland, it was the money advanced to Poles which prevented the British from doing a " Munich " over that unhappy country.

True to the British example, the Americans in 1939, were thinking of the huge sums of money invested in the Orient and the excellent opportunity presented by the coming world war to do a " China " over the British ; supply them with war material and bask in the sunshine of financial prosperity.

CHAPTER III

Pulling Chestnuts Out of Fire

"After the war" said Wendell Willkie in one of his speeches in the early days of war "the capital of the world will be either Berlin or Washington—I want it to be Washington." But the Yankee strategists and financiers had not waited for Willkie to say these words. They had begun planning to achieve such an aim. Willkie had not in view any territorial aggrandisement, when he said that nor had the strategists and financiers. What was wanted was a financial and political domination of the world which in certain cases would become if the *protege* happened to be too weak to defend itself and required American military help—military domination. It would have been impossible to whip up enthusiasm in the Yankee for any territorial expansion such as the Germans have in view in making Berlin as the capital of the world. He had enough territory and did not require any *Lebensraum*. But he had no objection if American capitalism tightened its noose round the neck of the nations and the militarists build up a big navy and Army to defend their land with its 150 years of democratic traditions.

What the average American understands from Washington becoming the capital of the world, was an

application of Monroe doctrine in an enlarged continent.....Instead of Washington being the capital of North and South America, it would be the capital of a greater area of world, financially, and politically dependent on U. S. A. just as the Latin American States are today; with American navy policing the sea routes to Asia, Europe, Africa and Australia; as it does today the South Atlantic and South Pacific coast.

What Mr. Willkie meant from this remark is not the matter under discussion. Mr. Willkie's views on freedom form the subject of discussion in the next chapters. He may have meant some string of world States knit together in a federation with Washington as its capital. But in that case why Washington, why not London or Moscow? Both are geographically best fitted to be capitals of the world. Industrially these countries are not backward to America. Either Mr. Willkie's world includes these two countries or it does not. If it does not it is a useless world. If it does London and Moscow due to their past efforts at making themselves capitals of the world have as good right as Washington to be the capital of Mr. Willkie's world.

Then why should Mr. Willkie insist on Washington? We can only say that he is a patriotic American wanting his own country to be the centre of world culture and civilisation. But that is not what most Americans think, or their bosses, the vested interests and mili-

tarists do. To them making Washington capital means something very much nearer the Nazi ideology.

It has been observed that America did not intervene at Tienstin because it wanted to make hay while the sun was shining.

And it did not want to make hay only, but to sell it to those countries, where sun was not shining and which were under the clouds.

The first choice in this carting of hay was Great Britain. The British had declared war on Germany in September 1939, with as much preparation after Munich as Napoleon had made after his return from Elba. They were saved very nearly from invasion of England in summer of 1940 by timely American help. The Americans did an extremely smart business for themselves. While the Press and the State Department were united in branding Germany as aggressor, Sumner Welles, was sent out to European capitals on a "Peace mission" which was in fact undertaken to report to the American President, the reaction of Rome and Berlin about the swing in favour of Britain in America, and whether it was safe to repeal the Neutrality Act or amend it so as to allow the British to have war supplies from U.S.A. When Sumner Welles returned the Luftwaffe had visited the British Isles and the British had realised the weight of the German Arms superiority and their inability to wage a successful war against Germany without American help.

The Americans were waiting precisely for such a mood in Britain, which should make Yankees pose as

benefactors and Saviours of a sister democracy, rather than hardheaded and cynical financiers that they were.

The "Cash and carry" Neutrality Act which was passed after return of Summer Welles from Europe, was a clever move in the game of power politics. The Americans lost nothing by allowing the British to get war materials from U.S.A. in their own ships on "cash and carry" basis. The Germans had not the Merchant Marine to enable them to purchase supplies from U.S.A. Besides an effective British blockade made it impossible for any German ship to sail in the Atlantic, knowing all this the ban on supplies to Germany, was a wise step taken by the State Department. The Germans did not resent it, because they did not wish to turn America hostile. They rather welcomed this for they had a superiority of submarines over the British and they could thus play havoc with British Merchant Marine. It was probably the knowledge about immense submarine building power of Germany, brought home by Summer Welles that made the Americans forbid the sailing of their ships in the war one.

Besides the submarines, some surface German raiders like *Graf spee* were abroad when war broke out and took an immense toll of British Navy.

Germany was also satisfied in another way. The Italian oil tanks were busy day and night during the first months of war shipping oil from U. S. A. to home

ports, from where it was sent across the Alps to Germany. The German submarines in the Mediterranean which sank British ships were quite often fuelled at Italian ports by the oil shipped from America. The submarines operating in the Atlantic were before their sailing equipped in German ports often with the American oil. Italy was doing Germany's "cash and carry" shipping of goods from U. S. A. Many goods besides oil were taken by Italian steamers from U. S. A. and then sent to Germany.

Japan did a similar job for Germany, taking the American goods on its ships and then sending them to its anti-comintern ally via Siberia. The facilities for transit of goods granted to Italy continued for several months, when the British Ambassador repeatedly drew attention to the Italian tactics, and when it became clear to U. S. A. government that the Italians were about to join Germany in the war; only then did they place embargo on goods to Italy. To Japan the goods were shipped, though somewhat on a reduced scale down to the outbreak of Russo-German war.

And all this was being done when the Hearst and Scripps—Howard newspapers owned by the very capitalists who were fattening on Axis and British money; were screaming anathems at the axis powers and applauding American help to the western democracies! The logic of these industrial magnates who governed America was clear. It was the financial domination of world. The Imperialists of Europe were fighting among themselves and America was fleecing the Imperialists.

The "cash and carry" neutrality together with the Lease and Lend Act was the greatest financial hoax since the *l'affaire stravinsky* in France in the year 1934 when the French government tumbled down. The government of Roosevelt did not tumble down because the "fleeing" in this case was not done of the people belonging to the same country but of countries across the seas. America did not receive money only. It received strategic basis too. In the summer of 1940 fifty destroyers were given to Britain in return for lease of strategic basis in the Atlantic. Canada was made practically an American possession due to its financial dependence on U.S.A. and because its war industries were being organised by the Yanks. The Americans had begun to consider defence of Canada as a matter directly affecting America,

But the cash and carry neutrality never benefited the countries that needed it most. Neither France nor the low countries ever benefited from it.

The Dutch and the Belgians never had the navy which could fetch war materials from across the Atlantic. If the American ships had been available to the Dutch, the Belgians and the French inspite of the rapidity of the German blitz the turn of events in Europe would have been different! And it was in interests of American Imperialism to keep the French and Dutch strength intact in order that their Far East possessions may not fall in hands of the Japs.

But the American Government wanted to live in

peace and to give capitalists greatest opportunity to make increased war profits. So it allowed France and Holland to crumble down. The waiting Japs timed their southward drive into Indo-China and Thailand with the collapse of France. American policy which helped Japan to conquer China, also helped that country to move southwards. The Americans could do nothing about Indo-China. When the Japs tried to brow-beat the Dutch government of the Indies the Americans showed their teeth to Japan and said they would not tolerate Jap attack on Indies. The Japanese refrained from any action, and the Americans were pleased, little knowing that Japan had begun its financial domination of the Indies precisely as the Yanks had been doing with the British. To the Americans Japan was not an immediate problem. The immediate problem was Europe and supplies to Britain. It liked its role in the European affairs and liked the name of "arsenal of democracy" that the American President had given it. The British were paying for the maintenance of the arsenal and out of this money and the prosperity of inflated war trade, the Americans built up a gigantic Navy and Air Force for themselves too.

The money was not coming from the British, the Japs or the Chinese only. It was coming from the Russians and the South American States also. The Americans had backed up the Finns against Russians because the Finns were paying their debts regularly. When the Finnish War ended and the Soviets began to reorganize

themselves, for an inevitable combat with Germany, the Americans came forward to have a trade agreement with them. In the summer of 1940 both the British and the Americans were wooing Russia. The Americans succeeded first. The "Imperialist Russia" of Soviet-Finnish war became "a friend of the Democracies," because it suited the American financiers to do trade with that country.

American exploitation in the south took a different form from that in case of the British, the Italians, the Japanese and the Chinese. Here America had no need to cloak its intentions in such garbled phrases as "Democracy," "open door policy," "anti-Nazism" etc. The South American States had been the first choice for Yankee expansion and ever since the last century close diplomatic and trade ties bound the two together. But South America was a vast region with population of various nationalities. True Europeans had been prevented from occupying any part of these States due to Monroe doctrine but this had not prevented infiltration of European ideas. In several American States such as Mexico, Argentine, Bolivia, and Brazil, these ideas had gained a foothold. Mexico was under a near-communist regime of Cardenas when the war broke out and Nazi intriguers were active in Brazil, Argentine and Bolivia. Nazi revolts in two of those republics were crushed with severity while pressure was put on Mexico to shed off its pro-Red sympathies. America was the main buyer of Mexican silver and

a good part of exports, of that country, if not all was shipped off to U S. A. The Mexicans did not shed their Red hue but they did not allow any facilities to Germans or pursue trade policy towards them approximating to that of Russia.

Other American republics were also suffering due to curtailment of trade with Germany and Great Britain, their main buyers. The American policy was clear. It was to capture the trade which was formally directed to European countries. As soon as the war was declared there began an incessant truck of Yankee capitalists and their agents to Latin American States.

Old talks about common destiny and brotherhood in face of European danger were revived. The Nazi revolts gave an opportunity to the alarmists to emphasise the need of solidarity with the great American Republic. The American President called a conference of 21 republics at Buenos Aires and went there to preside over it. Neutrality in European war was affirmed by all the republics with a blare of trumpets.

The undisguised glee with which the elder sister received all this talk of "united destiny" and "common ideals" among the people of the south can be judged from an article in "Foreign Affairs" by an American, Percy W. Bidwell, captioned "El Dorado Beckons." "A European war, the conditions of which gave the initial impetus to our trade expansion in 1915—20, is again present. The principal belligerents—England, France and Germany—were probably as before greatly handicapped in their attempts to

continue shipments of clothing, textile machinery and other industrial products to the ports of Central and South America. German trade will probably once more be entirely cut off. Will American exports again rush in to fill the gap? How will the war affect the ability of the Latin American countries to pay for imports? How far will our Government intervene actively to support the new trade expansion? Will such intervention help or hinder the development of permanent good-neighbour-policy?"

The reference to American government's intervention shows that the vested interests expected opposition from the nascent nationalism in those countries. In Mexico, Socialist policy of Cardenas in matters of expropriation of foreign oil interests was dictated as much by economic considerations as nationalist feelings. It was a desire of the Mexican people to control their own affairs. Similarly in Argentina, Brazil and Bolivia the Socialist and Nazi revolts, were actuated by Nationalistic motives. No doubt the large number of German residents in these countries were stirring up trouble but it was not any love of Nazi ideology or pro-German feelings that drove South Americans into the arms of the Nazis. It was a simple desire to manage their own house and since Nazism was also intensely nationalistic, it succeeded in establishing a foothold in those countries. In other words what the South Americans had copied was the Nazi methods of political warfare. But the governments of these countries anxious to curb such

a nationalistic revolt which would have strained the relations with U. S. A. resorted to violent means. The path for Yankee traders had been made smooth, but still in the hearts of Americans fears lurked, just as it did in hearts of Japanese about Chang Wang Wei or of Hitler about his Rumanian and Finn allies. The Japanese and the Germans, although they are getting all they can out of their vassals, yet cannot completely trust them. Similarly the Americans. But there was one difference between German and Japanese vassals, and the South American States. The South needed American help. War had badly hit its trade. Some idea of the loss can be gained from the following taken from the article of Percy. W. B. Bidwell.

Percentage of total exports in 1938.

Country	To the United Kingdom.	To Germany.
Bolivia	62'5	1'1
Argentina	31'8	11'5
Uruguay	26'1	23'5
Costa Rica	24'4	19'2
Chile	21'8	10'0
Peru	20'0	10'6
Brazil	8'8	19'1

Argentina depends on the British market for an outlet of 90 per cent of its meat exports, for over one-third of its corn and for one-quarter of its wool. Brazil disposes of the bulk of its cotton crop to Germany and the United Kingdom ; Chilean wool is sold

principally to Germany and the United Kingdom. The latter takes practically all of the Chilean exports of mutton. France and Germany are larger buyers of Columbian, Brazilian and Central American coffees.

This shows the utter helplessness of the South American States in face of wooing by Yankee capitalists. The wooing was done by an entirely new kind of Imperialist tactics, unlike that of the British; the Americans have always recognised the need of South American States managing their own affairs. They have in every way sought to appease the Nationalist element and kept as far as possible the use of force in abeyance. The American traders have given credits to the South American republics to build up their industry with American men and machines, knowing that the exports would flow to U.S.A., and thus money would return to them in an increased amount, while the noose round the neck of the republics would remain tight as before.

Similar tactics were resorted to by the Americans when they turned their attention to Balkans, Middle East and India in the year 1941. The Balkans have come into news, as a result of impending German Putsch in these countries in early 1941. While the British were never able to take advantage of the existence of Nationalistic feelings in these small states, the Americans were running neck to neck with the Germans for gaining monopoly of Balkan trade. A special representative of President Roosevelt was in

Sofia and Belgrade before the German Blitz came to assure them that they had only to arrange for ships and America would send them what they needed. British Navy's support in conveying goods was hinted at. But Hitler had greater prizes to offer to these countries at the expense of Greece, which the British and Americans never could due to British alliance with the Greeks. Besides the Americans had appeared somewhat late on the scene to do lease and lend business in the Balkans. Nazi agents had spread themselves everywhere in Bulgaria ; and in Yugoslavia they had stirred up the Croats against Serbs. So the Americans failed there but succeeded in doing some business with Turkey. The British Navy played a prominent part in shipping goods to that country because the British wanted to use Turkey as a buffer State, stone-walling the German drive to the East. A large number of American planes and tanks were shipped to Turkey, and many new contracts taken. As the Germans, due to their attack on Russia, were unable to supply Turkey the articles needed, the Turkish dependence on U.S.A. became complete.

From Turkey, Iran and India are not far off and having come so far, it was inevitable the Americans should take interests in affairs of these countries. Both America and Britain had their trade investments in Iranian oil. For some time past the Shah had behaved towards foreign investors much as the Mexicans had towards the British and American shareholders in

their oil companies. Neither of the two investors had been pleased with the Shah of Iran. Apart from oil there were other opportunities for American businessmen in Iran, and one of them was the building of a railway linking Persian Gulf to the Caspian Sea.

India had begun to figure in American Press after the outbreak of war, but the British propaganda had effectively screened from American eyes the real situation in the country. Hence the diffidence of American statesmen to interfere in India and the lack of interest exhibited by the Press.

The Civil Disobedience of 1940, was over-shadowed by the threatened invasion of Britain during the summer and winter of that year, and the events in other parts of Europe and so it passed practically unnoticed in the American Press.

It was only after Germany had invaded Russia, and the Yanks had tied Turkey and Iran to their apron string that they turned to India. But it was only a look of detached amusement with which they viewed India and China. Chinese had liberated themselves with great difficulty from the war-lords and established republic and then the Americans had come forward to claim their special rights. Let the Indians do the same. Let them get freedom for themselves if they can, and then they would come forward to claim concessions for American trade and lend to strengthen Yankee political and military hold in the East !

That was how the American politicians viewed the Indian situation.

A section of public and newspapers with foresight but in a hopeless minority took up the question of release of Indian Congress leaders and opening up of negotiations with that body. The newspapers were "New Republic" and "Nation." These papers have very limited circulation in that country and could not influence the American policy.

The American attitude to India was illustrated by the fact that the entry of such able men as Mahatma Gandhi into America after the war on the one hand was a communist but they could not do anything of Feroz Khan Noon, when he had come to spread the British view of the situation in that country. Shrewd politicians while on the one hand they began an anti-Indian drive in the states on the other climbed down in India and released the Congress leaders. The game of bluff to hoodwink intelligent and freedom loving people in America and England was on, and the American Government was aiding the British in spreading the belief that since Japan had attacked the Allies their attitude towards India had changed and they wanted India to take her equal place among the United Nations and do her best for the Allied cause.

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The American attitude towards India could be best illustrated by the fact that they could ban the entry of such able men as John Strachey in America after the war on the grounds that he was a communist but they could not ban the visit of Feroz Khan Noon, when he had obviously come to spread the British view of the Indian situation in that country. Shrewd British politicians while on the one hand they began an anti-Indian drive in the states on the other climbed down in India and released the Congress leaders. The game of bluff to hoodwink intelligent and freedom loving people in America and England was on, and American Government was aiding the British in spreading the belief that since Japan had attacked the Allies their attitude towards India had changed and they wanted India to take her equal place among the United Nations and do her best for the Allied cause.

And then the tone of American Press changed too from one of disinterestedness to that of anxiety over the

welfare of India. That the American Government felt about India's safety was obvious enough, the Press reflecting its anxiety. But it did not give any impression of independence of judgment. The British had called a halt in repression, and were sounding the Congress for some compromise and the American Government was content to watch.

CHAPTER IV

Wardha and Washington

The interest of Washington in Wardha had been awakened a little before Pearl Harbour by the appeals for release of Nehru made by such papers of left as the "New Republic", and "Life." Pearl Harbour and its aftermath made that country busy with its military strategy ; and the problems of Anglo-American co-operation to stop Japan were such that little attention was paid to ease the Indian political situation. The Cripps' mission made Washington again interested in India and in order to encourage this interest, the same press sympathetic to India was doing whatever it could to present the Indian Nationalist vein of the situation ; but Louis Fischer who visited India indulged in some plain speaking about the interest of Washington in Wardha. He said :

" Cripps packed his bags. However one more effort was made to retrieve the situation throughout the month of February 1942 watching Jap advance in the Far East. President Roosevelt had taken a lively interest in the Indian question and when the British finally decided to send Mr. Cripps to India, the White House despatched to Churchill a proposal for the solution of the Indian problem. President Roosevelt followed every step of the Cripps negotiations

and when the break came on April 9 he tried to persuade Churchill to keep Cripps in India and resume the talks. But Cripps did not stay "

The idea of Roosevelt persuading Churchill to keep Cripps in India and Cripps refusing is too fantastic to be entertained, whatever the past record of that socialist knight ; he had proved a very good quisling in hands of Tories, and the man who faithfully served in Moscow could not deviate from any line laid down by his Tory masters. Fact is that Mr. Roosevelt did not take a keen interest in Indian affairs ; at least not anything equal to that he has taken in North African affairs recently. If the American generals there could ride roughshod over the wishes of fighting frenchmen in regard to peace with Vichy representatives and make up with Giraud could not the same be done in India ?

But here the allies did not face a serious military situation. Hence the American coolness and British intransigence ; Louis Fischer realises all this reluctance on the part of Britain and America to part with power and says :—

" The realistic answer all the constitutional quibbling is this : as Gandhi and everybody else in India agrees, the British armed forces and the American armed forces must stay in India to fight this war. If the British allowed an Indian government to be set up in these circumstances that government would not

exercise complete power. The British would retain a great deal of power and certainly enough to prevent chaos or a separate peace. The best time for the British to begin the transfer of political power to the Indians is in war-time when so much of the physical control of the country remains in British hands. But the British do not see it that way, it is not a matter of legalisms; the will is not there.

"The Cripps mission accordingly boils down to this: Sir Stafford offered the Indians a post-war settlement which they all rejected. For the war, he offered them participation in a Viceroy's council which already existed and in which the Viceroy's voice was stronger than that of its Indian membership. He offered them very limited tasks, such as canteens etc., in the defence of their country. Congress would have none of it because it was convinced that on this basis the enthusiasm and co-operation of the Indian masses for the war could not be enlisted.

"If this is all that Sir Stafford Cripps carried to India, why did he go at all?"

He came here for the same reason that he went to Russia—to aid the British Tory policy. There the object was an alliance between Communist Russia and capitalist Britain. Here the other party whose alliance was sought was the Indian National Congress. The object was on the face of it impossible in both cases unless the international situation took a serious turn or the government in England

changed its political complexion. The methods followed in both countries were crude. In the former case Cripps tried to bring about a sudden rupture between Nazi Germany and Soviet Russia, while influential people in Britain talked about a war against a totalitarian combination from Cologne to Vladivostok. In India a similar attempt was made to increase the differences between the Congress and the Muslim League. This attempt too failed. The two are not as much apart from each other as Communism is from Nazism. There is always a greater possibility of an alliance between the two parties than there has been of a synthesis of Communism and Nazism. Communism and Nazism are two opposite poles; the one is aiming at complete socialisation of economic resources of the country; the other represents the last stage of capitalism in its struggle against revolutionary forces—Nazism is capitalism in arms.

When Stafford Cripps went to Russia, Nazism had not entered into final struggle for power. It was in arms. But it had not mobilised all the resources of European capitalism. The war through Imperialism was limited to England and France. The German war aims were defeat of these powers and grabbing of territory lost by Germany at Versailles. A *modus vivendi* between it and Russia was possible for sometime at least till Germany should bid for world domination.

The condition in India was different. Here an alliance between the two parties is at any time possible. Both are the products of *laissez faire* civilisation ; a capitalist society which has not known the economic crises as Germany and Russia have ; having never reached that stage of development. They are like the Conservative and Liberal parties and cannot for long pull differently. Sir Stafford Cripps with his knowledge of Marxist dialectics failed to grasp this fact and sought at the instance of Whitehall to sow the seeds of dissention here. On his return from India he wrote an article in an American paper, which struck a very pessimistic note about Indian political situation and painted the communal outlook in as much luridity as some Nazi writer before the war, Dr. Kropp for instance, would have done writing in *Hamburger Fremdenblatt* about the differences between the Czechs and the Slovaks—and the only way to end them—namely occupation by German *Wehrmacht*.

Similarly Stafford Cripps suggested that Indian differences were insoluble and the best way was to go ahead with war. The Americans accepted this view of Indian situation with an amazing complacency ; only good old Louis Fischer struck a discordant note about India as he did about Spain in 1938 when he pleaded with the Americans for aid to Republican government while Roosevelt under influence of Pope's special envoy wanted America to adopt a benevolent neutrality favouring France. Said Fischer :—

" asked Nawabzada Liaquat Ali Khan, the Secretary of the Muslim League (a Nawabzada is the son of a Nawab and a Nawab is a title of big landlord) whether the Muslims would join a real National Government. He said ' Yes, if Pakistan (a separate Muslim dominion), were granted.' Then as a result of such collaboration we might decide that we did not want to divide India. On August 17 the " New York Times " reported a statement made by Jinnah in Bombay. After much rich verbiage about what terrible things he would do if the British reached an agreement with Congress and the Hindus, he came down to earth and said "repeatedly" according to the despatch that he was ready to form a Provincial Government of India. " Naturally," he added, "it would be necessary to obtain the support of all groups, including the Congress." This is direct enough. It means that Jinnah would co-operate with Congress inside a National Government. Of course since then Jinnah has seen the Viceroy and may have decided to become more intransigent. But I carried out of India the definite conviction that if the British wished they could have a working unity in India within twenty-four hours."

The British however did not wish it, nor did the Americans for that matter. Said the British Secretary of State Amery: " Indians should try to learn working in harmony with each other by joining the Viceroy's expanded Legislative Council during the war—and after that we will see what can be done." The

American State Department dotted the i's and crossed the t's of British statesman's announcements.

But suppose the British had said the same to Washington when he raised the banner of revolt.

The British were at that time fighting the French in India and elsewhere though officially no war had been declared. Suppose they had asked the Americans to help them and wait for Independence till it had emerged out, for instance, the Congress of Vienna in 1814—would the Americans have waited? They did not. They won the battle from Britain, consolidated their strength while the Napoleonic wars lasted and did not send a single soldier to fight for the British.

Take the case of American civil war. Abraham Lincoln ended slavery in the parts under his control before the drive southwards, and in the South too whichever part was liberated, there the rich slave owners were exterminated and slaves freed. This did not prevent him from laying stress on the union of South and North as his war aim. The North Americans knew what they were fighting for—it was not any union of Free North with slave owning South (though Lincoln said that he would have such a union if the South wished, but that was palpably absurd, and said only to avoid bloodshed of his countrymen which was inevitable).

And finally we have the case of the Civil War in China in 1927-34. While the Civil War raged the Foreign

Powers did not wait for emergence of a strong China to press forward their claims of "special rights" violated during the riots of 1923-25. In fact Americans and others encouraged the strife among the Chinese and continued to fleece them while they fought each other in a civil war.

Why did the Americans object to others doing what they had done themselves? The Indians could if entrusted with central government defend their country better than the foreigners could. Observe what Edgar Snow has to say to his fellow-countrymen on this subject. "Only an incredible capacity for self-deception could now prevent us from recognising the imperative necessity of making every effort immediately to release all possible power and responsibility to Indians, except while it is demonstrably incompatible with the defence requirements of the allies. Now this is the only way of retaining any following in this part of the world short of overwhelming force which we simply do not possess. And by "demonstrably", I do not mean any of the stock arguments. Sound as they may seem to some even now, they would never excuse us in Asiatic eyes if while still denying the understandable Indian desire for responsibility in their own country in a moment of dire peril the British and ourselves failed to save the country—as well as we might with a hostile population behind us. It is still possible to get an agreement with Indians which will make them as valuable to us as the Chinese. The majority still are for the allies,

but the price of this co-operation now cannot be lowered a farthing. It is no less than a clear and final renunciation of all prerogatives of Imperialism here against which we claim to be fighting elsewhere in the world."

Mr. Edgar Snow was right in summing up the reaction of India to American stand and the desire of the people here to have nothing short of complete transference of power at the centre.

As Cripps left India the "Vansittartite" inside the Congress gained strength—that is the section which took much the same view about British and Americans, as Lord Vansittartite took of Germans.

Nehru and Gandhi both with their foreign education had good opinion of Americans. Both kept the bridge against Indian Vansittartites. But the attitude of the American Government was impossible to understand. So gradually disillusionment deepened in both of them. Nehru who had in February characterised the British as "Baniyas" and Americans as true lovers of freedom, in July and August he was very much indignant, with some people across the Atlantic. Said Nehru in Bombay on August 3 :—

"I am prepared to make many allowances for the emotional background in England and in America. I do not really mind if people get angry. But I am sorry for the people in England and in America who have a perverted way of looking at the Indian question. They are so wrong that they would land themselves in difficulty. After all, think just what would be the

course of history particularly that of Britain, if she had done the right thing by India in the last two years. If Britain had done rightly the entire history of the war would be different. But in spite of perils and disasters, England has stuck to her Imperialism and Empire.

"It is a curious tangle that we are in. It is not going to be untangled by shouting or by the approaches of the British Government. If I may, with all respect, suggest to the great people of America that they have all gone wrong in regard to India, China, the whole of Asia and you (America) have looked upon India as the appendage of Britain and Asia as the dependents of Europe and America. Some of you have thought in terms of benevolence towards these countries, but always with that taint of racial superiority. You have considered yourself with your inventions of the Machine Age, to be infinitely better than us—and that we are a benighted backward people—but the people of Asia do not propose to be treated in that manner any longer. Asia is the mother continent of the world and India and China constitute the real mother country of the world. What is the good of a people simply because they have some very great material achievements when they have forgotten and are not learning the very essence and art of living. They have built and are building better motor cars. This is a machine age. But we will also learn to build better machines. The Americans have forgotten the magnificent achievements of China and India."

At the A.I.C.C. meeting in Bombay he warmed up because the American Press had backed up the British attitude of holding pistol at India. After saying that he regretted that people in England and America were looking at every question from the narrow soldier's point of view, he said, "I can only tell them that Indians cannot be deterred from their course by any amount of threats; on the other hand, they (Americans) ought to realise that at this stage threats could only make the position infinitely worse and more difficult for them."

The position was made worse at Bombay when the A.I.C.C. decided to vote for civil disobedience movement. Gandhi's speech at that session was the best warning to the Governments of England and America. Gandhi's view about America was substantially same as Nehru's, only he was not so angry, and spoke to his opponents in a soft but determined voice. He had an intention to appeal to President Roosevelt before launching the struggle. The British did not permit him that. Yet what he had written in "Harijan" earlier under the caption of "To My American Friends" could suffice as an appeal if the Americans had chosen to hear his voice. Wrote Gandhi :—

"You have made common cause with Great Britain. You cannot therefore disown responsibility or anything that her representatives do in India. You will do a grievous wrong to the Allied cause if you do not sift the truth from the chaff whilst there is yet time. Just think of it. Is there anything wrong in the Congress

demanding unconditional recognition of India's Independence? It is being said, 'But this is not the time.' We say, "This is the psychological moment for that recognition. For then and then only can there be irresistible opposition to Japanese aggression. It is of immense value to the allied cause if it is also of equal value to India. The Congress had anticipated and provided for every possible difficulty in the way of recognition. I want you to look upon the immediate recognition of India's Independence as a war measure of first class magnitude."

That the Americans deliberately sat quiet, even at this eleventh hour, becomes clear from the article of Edgar Snow published in U.S.A. on his return from India:—

"Pandit Nehru and the present Congress President, Maulana Azad representing the militant anti-Japanese section in the Party felt the need for demonstration to induce the United States of America to bring pressure on Mr. Churchill which means of course pressure from the President himself. Maulana Azad and Pandit Nehru particularly the latter placed some hopes on American intervention and when Colonel Louis Johnson, the former Commissioner in Delhi went home last year Pandit Nehru had told him what the Congress wanted President Roosevelt to do and indicated how Indian support for the war was mobilisable.

Since then Pandit Nehru and Louis Johnson had been corresponding and Pt. Nehru held back Gandhi for two months waiting hopefully for Washington to act.

When nothing happened Pandit Nehru and Maulana Azad reluctantly yielded to Gandhi in favour of civil disobedience move. Pandit Nehru explained to me that it was the only alternative as far as he could see—blow for freedom accompanied by a last dramatic open appeal based on India's defence needs."

Suppose the American Government had after Gandhiji's appeal addressed a sharp note to Britain telling them what Mr. Edgar Snow says about the need of an agreement with Indian Nationalists—the answer would have been swift and the British would have done the right thing about India.

CHAPTER V

India's "Friends" in America

The American journalists who visited India have on their return to mother country pleaded the cause of Indian Independence. We have seen that John Gunther, Edgar Snow and Louis Fischer utter a stern warning to the Americans about the need of making India free now. What about other liberals and radicals of America? How many of them are India's friends and can anything be expected from such quarters? Let us begin with Roosevelt. His partymen in America are never tired of telling their countrymen, that Roosevelt is the greater American since Washington, Jefferson, and Abraham Lincoln. The American official representatives in India have been assiduously building up similar monuments about Roosevelt and carrying on a spate of propaganda through leaflets, which tell the Asiatics that the American President wants freedom of all countries—freedom from want, fear, and poverty. Is it true? Is Roosevelt the great Democrat? They would have us think he is.

Let us compare him with Mr. Churchill. He seems hardly different from the latter. Both have fought for their country, the former during the American Imperialist drive in Haiti and the latter during the N.-W.-F. P. campaigns in India in 1898 and the Boer War. Both have favoured bigger Navy for their countries and built them as Naval Secretaries. Both are men of radical

tradition, Churchill being a liberal down to the year 1921 when he became conservative, after the break-up of the Liberal Party. But his conservatism was in many ways more liberal than that of the official Liberal Party itself, so far as collective security and international affairs were concerned. In other matters such as Empire and India, Churchill was a full-blooded Imperialist. The same is true of Roosevelt ; the same blend of liberalism and conservatism is to be found in him. While he has upheld Collective Security, and favoured New Deal in America, his policy about China, Spain and India has never been as much liberal as that of some republicans like Wendell Willkie. His opponents have made great political capital out of his blunders in the Far East. His home policy from 1933 to 1941 made it imperative that America should have been allied with Japan, even if it meant abandoning China to the Nippon. And this has been true of other countries of the East too. While the Americans talk now of liberating all Asiatic countries from white and other dominations, they should not forget that they had ample opportunity in the past but did not avail of it. The French rule in Indo-China, the Dutch in the East Indies and the British in Burma and Malaya continued. The Americans never cared about the coloured population. A great opportunity arose in 1940 to give freedom to the oppressed peoples of Dutch Indies, French Indo-China, Burma, Malaya and India, when the French and Dutch Imperialism had crumbled down. The Americans could have moved before the

Japs had, and put pressure on white powers to surrender control to the people. It is extremely doubtful if the Japs could do anything then, with the battle of Britain still undecided and Russian army in the heyday of its strength. But that should have meant to the Wall Street financiers the abandoning of extremely pleasant occupation of stripping the British, the South Americans, the Japs and the Chinese of all they had! It was not done then, when the French, the Dutch and the British were at war. How can we believe that the American President would do any such thing once these nations emerge victorious? His attitude towards India belies any such assumption.

The test of all these professions of liberating Asia after the war is liberating all those territories which are not under Japanese occupation now. India is such a country.

Next to Roosevelt India's "Friend" is Wendell Willkie, Roosevelt's rival and ex-anti-communist and isolationist. Willkie is one of those Americans who have quickly recanted after the American intervention in Finland and since then gradually gone "left." He has recently toured China and the other countries of the East.

The travel seems to have changed him, and his present views are in contrast with his past "Washington as capital of the world" Nationalism. That was said before the "People's War" epoch, and many other liberals besides Willkie were then doing the sabre-rattling for the capitalists and imperialists. Such attitude was at least understandable if not excusable.

Now however, he speaks differently; advocating full freedom for India and China, as a prelude to a united effort against the axis.

"I tell you we cannot fight this war in silence, whatever our experts may say. In order that we may win real victory, we must encourage to the utmost the amount of discussion among ourselves and with our allies. Russia and China have each already suffered greater loss in this war than all the rest of us put together. Those two enormous nations are also our allies and consequently when we talk about reaching agreement among the Allied peoples we must mean the Russian people and the Chinese people as well as the British people and the American people. We must go further, we must try to find out and openly express the desires and hopes of hundreds of millions of other peoples—in the torn-heart of Europe, in India, on the embattled shores of the Mediterranean, in Africa, on the southern shores of Asia and in our own hemisphere."

All this is nearer to the teachings of Abraham Lincoln, than anything that Roosevelt has said. But it is not enough. Mr. Willkie is a very rich man, one of the leading Industrialists of America with great influence over several American newspapers, and Radio companies.

A drive for "Free India" could be successfully carried on by him through these agencies. Mr. Willkie could lead such a campaign as the Republican senators during the last war did that of Irish Freedom.

To a great extent the British show-down in Ireland was due to the campaign in America carried on by Irish Americans and Republican senators. But we have not any Indian Americans that they should influence the votes of senators of U.S.A. Hence the fizzling out of pro-Indian campaign of Wendell Willkie before it had assumed even one-tenth of proportion of the demonstrations of Irish Americans. Mr. Willkie, whatever his personal views, is a part and parcel of the Republican party machine, and that party does not think India is of great electoral advantage at present.

Other persons favourably disposed to Indians are Intellectuals and Liberals of the type represented by Bertrand Russell, Pearl Buck, Upton Sinclair and several others. These writers are widely read in America and respected. What they say about India is heard by all Americans with respect, just as utterances of H. G. Wells and Bernard Shaw are in England, but as the latter are powerless to change the policy of the Tory government headed by Mr. Churchill or even get a ban on "Daily Worker" lifted (Bernard Shaw was one of the first to point out the need of lifting the ban, yet it is only recently that Mr. Morrison has taken this step), so these American writers are unable to move the White House. Their voice is encouraging to us. We respect them just as we do the anti-Fascist exiles from Germany like Einstein, Ludwig Renn, and Bertold Brecht, but we know that these men are unable to check Hitler from his policy of conquest and

oppression. Similarly Russel and others can have no power to change the American policy about India.

Of the two American trade unions which can put pressure on State Department, the American Federation of Labour headed by Lewis Green is pro-British and a trans-Atlantic breach of Citrine's T. U. C.

The other C.I.O. is leftist, but amenable like A.F. of L. to capitalist influence. At present the communists and their fellow-travellers are quite prominent in the peculiar American structure of capitalism has tended to place the trade unions in the hands of capitalists. It is only since six or seven years that the trade unions have begun to take interest

If the C.I.O. were dominated by the communists or if there were any anarchist trade union like the Spanish F.I.A. industrial action in the Indian campaign would have been certain. As for the trade unions we come to the Press. Here the situation is even more disturbing. The Press is controlled by a group of capitalists like William Randolph Hearst and Scripps Howard, who have great stakes in Industry, and consequently the newspapers toe the line that suits the Industrialists. It is no more suits Hearst to switch on to an anti-British campaign than it did to him a few years ago, to restrain his Press from maligning the regime of Cardenas in Mexico, when it sought to expropriate the foreign holdings in Mexican oil companies. He and his brother Industrialists have great financial transactions with the city of London and the Bank of England. They can't break these loyalties. Those

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of American magnates who do not own any newspaper and have not many financial ties with London, have social ties at least. An American rich woman always prefers to marry in British society so that she should be called a "lady", and have a titled husband. Churchill's mother is an American. The great Industrial magnates Vanderbilts have social ties across the Atlantic, the widow of Vanderbilt having married an Englishman.

In view of all this, these magnates, exercise a pro-British influence on newspapers by holding up the threat of withdrawal of advertisements.

So much about the big newspapers. There are others, lesser known like "The Christian Science Monitor," "The Nation" and "The New Republic" and some Middlewest newspapers, coming from cities which are far removed from both sides of the ocean and thus not swept away by the wave of pro-British feelings which frequently surge over the Atlantic coast; these papers alone take a dispassionate view of Indian situation and denounce Yankee Imperialism too.

They have rendered immense service to the Indian cause. But they can no more get America rallied on side of India than "Daily Worker" and "Labour Monthly" in the months immediately after the outbreak of war could swing the British Government's opinion towards Russia. And this in spite of the fact that we never gave the American Government and British Government the reason to be annoyed with us, as the Russians did by signing Nazi-Soviet Pact.

An American correspondent of an Indian paper writing under the caption of "All Quiet on Indian Front in America" paints a true picture of the work done for and against India in America during the year 1942.

"There was a flutter in the dovecotes of America over the Indian deadlock. The flutter was caused as a result of the disclosure made by independent liberty-loving publicists like Mr. Louis Fischer, regarding the Macchiavellian policies pursued in this country. On his return from India to America he contributed articles to the "Nation" with a view to telling the truth about this country to his countrymen and awakening their conscience. The "Nation" published them unhesitatingly. "The Nation" is an irrepressible liberal paper which strikes out freely at Imperialistic chicanery and hypocrisy with its trusty cutlass. In its righteous campaign on behalf of Indian nationalism it was supported, not very vigorously though, by the 'Christian Science Monitor' which would never permit its upright policy to be destroyed by extraneous influences. Journals like these stimulated democratic emotions to such an extent that there was an extensive up-surge of sympathetic feeling for the Indian cause in America. Even "The New York Times", and "The New York Herald Tribune", which originally held that India was Britain's cow and no-body in America had any right to say how she should be kept, free or tethered and how and in whose interest she should be milched, changed the trend of

their argument and began to urge unctuously the consideration of the Indian demand.

The American correspondents in India though hampered by the censor augmented the swelling wave of pro-Indian sentiment. And there was an emotional landslide in favour of India. Britain was upset. She turned her propaganda batteries towards the United States. Tory-tongues wagged feverishly on the radio and pampered bards of the Sarkar crossed the high seas to tell Americans that their motherland was not fit for self-government. Suddenly the pro-Indian agitation in America subsided.

Since the above message was sent there has been a new development in Indo-American relations, and that is the sending of American envoy to India, Mr. Phillips. He comes as a personal representative of President Roosevelt. When asked at a Delhi Press Conference, what he proposed to do in order to end the crisis in India and whether he would see the leaders in person, he said "I shall not answer that question now."

However as his stay was prolonged he did make an effort to see the Indian leaders in prison, but he was not allowed to do so. When he departed from this country to America he was not so reticent with the journalists as when he came, and he told them as he must that he had not been permitted to see the leaders.

Since then no fresh efforts have been made by the Americans to solve the Indian tangle. However after the recent Cairo and Teheran Conference their *orinet*

politik has changed and renunciation of extra territoriality in China is the first step in that direction. If the Americans change their attitude towards India they would come nearer to the traditions of Lincoln and Washington than they have done in the past fifty years.

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